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Abstract
We present a precise denition of cause and
eect in terms of a fundamental notion called
unresponsiveness. Our denition is based on
Savage's (1954) formulation of decision the-
ory and departs from the traditional view of
causation in that our causal assertions are
made relative to a set of decisions. An im-
portant consequence of this departure is that
we can reason about cause locally, not re-
quiring a causal explanation for every depen-
dency. Such local reasoning can be benecial
because it may not be necessary to determine
whether a particular dependency is causal to
make a decision. Also in this paper, we ex-
amine the graphical encoding of causal rela-
tionships. We show that inuence diagrams
in canonical form are an accurate and e-
cient representation of causal relationships.
In addition, we establish a correspondence
between canonical form and Pearl's causal
theory.
Keywords: causality, causal model, causal
theory, causal networks, inuence diagrams,
canonical form, counterfactual reasoning
1 Introduction
Most traditional models of uncertainty, including
Markov networks (Lauritzen, 1982) and Bayesian net-
works (Pearl, 1988) have focused on the associational
relationship among variables as captured by condi-
tional independence and dependence. Associational
knowledge, however, is not sucient when we want to
make decisions under uncertainty. For example, al-
though we know that smoking and lung cancer are
probabilistically dependent, we cannot conclude from
this knowledge that we will decrease our chances of
getting lung cancer if we stop smoking. In general, to
make rational decisions, we need to be able to predict
the eects of our actions.
Recent work by Articial Intelligence researchers,
statisticians, and philosophers|for example, Pearl
and Verma (1991), Druzdzel and Simon (1993), and
Spirtes et al. (1993)|have emphasized the impor-
tance of identifying causal relationships for purposes
of modeling the eects of intervention. They argue,
for example, that if we believe that smoking causes
lung cancer, then we believe that our choice whether
to continue or quit smoking can aect whether we get
lung cancer. In contrast, if we believe that smoking
does not cause lung cancer, our choice will not aect
whether we get lung cancer, and the observed corre-
lation between smoking and lung cancer could be ex-
plained perhaps by a common cause of both (e.g., a
genetic predisposition toward cancer and the desire to
smoke), which we are unable to control.
This recent work has led to signicant breakthroughs
in causal reasoning. For example, Pearl and Verma
(1991) and Spirtes et al. (1993) have shown how causal
knowledge represented graphically can be used to pre-
dict the eects of interventions and how observational
data can be used to suggest causal relationships, and
Pearl (1995) has shown how, given a qualitative causal
structure, the quantitative eects of intervention may
be estimated from observational data alone in some
situations.
In this paper, we oer three improvements to the cur-
rent work in causal reasoning. First, the current ap-
proaches either take causality as a primitive notion, or
provide only a fuzzy, intuitive denition of cause and
eect. For example, in the introduction of their book
on causation, Spirtes et al. (1993, p. 42) write:
We understand causation to be a relation be-
tween particular events: something happens
and causes something else to happen. Each
cause is a particular event and each eect is a
particular event. An event A can have more
than one cause, none of which alone suce to
produce A. An event A can also be overde-
termined: it can have more than one set of
causes that suce for A to occur. We as-
sume that causation is transitive, irreexive,
and antisymmetric.
In this paper, we oer a denition of causation in terms
of a more fundamental relation that we call unrespon-
siveness. Our denition is precise, and can be used
as an assessment aid when someone is having trouble
determining whether or not a relationship is causal.
Also, our denition can help people accurately com-
municate their beliefs about causal relationships. In
addition, the denition facilitates the development of
techniques for learning causal relationships from data
(Heckerman, this proceedings).
Second, the current approaches require all relation-
ships to be causal. That is, for any two probabilisti-
cally dependent events or variables x and y in a given
domain, these methods require a user to assert either
that x causes y, y causes x, or they are linked by
a chain of causal relationships, such as when x and
y share a common cause, or x and y are common
causes of an observed variable. For example, Pearl and
Verma's (1991) causal model is a directed acyclic graph
(DAG), wherein every node corresponds to a variable
and every arc from nodes x to y corresponds to the
assertion that x is a direct cause of y. When using a
causal model to represent a domain, a causal explana-
tions must hold for every dependency in the domain.
Our denition of causation is local in that it does not
require all relationships to be causal. This property
can be advantageous when making decisions. Namely,
given a particular decision problem, there may be no
need to assign a causal explanation to all dependencies
in the domain in order to determine a rational course
of action. Consequently, our denition may enable a
decision maker to reason more eciently.
Third, we describe a special condition on an inuence
diagram known as canonical form and show how it
can be used to represent causal relationships more ef-
ciently than existing representations.
Our approach is consistent with several current meth-
ods for reasoning about causality, including Pearl's
causal theory (Pearl and Verma, 1991; Pearl, 1995)
and causal networks of Spirtes et al. (1993). In ad-
dition, our approach is consistent with the philosophy
of decision analysis as described by Savage (1954) and
rened by Howard (1990). Thus, our discussions here
oer a means by which the two disciplines may begin
to communicate and contribute to each other's work.
This paper is a sequel to that presented at last year's
conference (Heckerman and Shachter, 1994). Here, we
clarify and generalize many of the concepts in the pre-
vious paper, including those of unresponsiveness (for-
merly discussed in terms of xed sets), mapping vari-
able, cause, set decision, and canonical form.
2 Unresponsiveness
In this section, we introduce the notions of unrespon-
siveness and limited unresponsiveness, fundamental re-
lations underlying causation.
Important to our discussion are several distinctions
from classical decision theory as described by Savage
(1954). In particular, we distinguish between alterna-
tives (what Savage called \acts"), realizations (what
Savage called \consequences"), and possible states of
the world.
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Savage describes and illustrates these con-
cepts as follows:
To say that a decision is to be made is
to say that one or more [alternatives] is to
be chosen, or decided on. In deciding on an
[alternative], account must be taken of the
possible states of the world, and also of the
[realizations] implicit in each [alternative] for
each possible state of the world. A [realiza-
tion] is anything that may happen to the per-
son.
Consider an example. Your wife has just
broken ve good eggs into a bowl when you
come in and volunteer to nish making the
omelet. A sixth egg, which for some rea-
son must either be used for the omelet or
wasted altogether, lies unbroken beside the
bowl. You must decide what to do with this
unbroken egg. Perhaps it is not too great an
oversimplication to say that you must de-
cide among three [alternatives] only, namely,
to break it into the bowl containing the other
ve, to break it into a saucer for inspection,
or to throw it away without inspection. De-
pending on the state of the egg, each of these
three [alternatives] will have some [realiza-
tion] of concern to you, say that indicated by
Table 1.
For purposes of our discussion, there are two points
to emphasize from Savage's exposition. First, it is im-
portant to distinguish between that which we can con-
trol directly|namely, alternatives|and that which
we can control only indirectly through choosing an
alternative|namely, realizations. Second, once we
choose an alternative, the realization that occurs is log-
ically determined by the state of the world. Of course,
this realization can be (and usually is) uncertain, be-
cause the state of the world is uncertain.
1
We use the term \alternative" in place of \act", be-
cause the former is more commonly used today. We use
the term \realization" in place of \consequence" because
it avoids the connotation that we should necessarily care
about a realization. That is, we often want to model re-
alizations, even though we don't directly care about them.
In using dierent terms for these concepts, however, we do
not intend to change their meanings.
Table 1: An example illustrating alternatives, possible states of the world, and realizations. (Taken from Savage
[1954].)
state of the alternative
world break into bowl break into saucer throw away
good six-egg omelet six-egg omelet and a ve-egg omelet and one
saucer to wash good egg destroyed
bad no omelet and ve good ve-egg omelet and a ve-egg omelet
eggs destroyed saucer to wash
Table 2: The four possible states of the world for a
decision to continue or quit smoking.
state of the alternative
world continue quit
1 cancer no cancer
2 no cancer no cancer
3 cancer cancer
4 no cancer cancer
In the omelet story, the possible states of the world
readily come to mind given the description of the prob-
lem. Furthermore, we can observe the state the world
(i.e., the condition of the egg). In many if not most
situations, however, the state of the world is unob-
servable; and we can only bring the possible states
to mind by thinking about the alternatives and re-
alizations. For example, suppose we have a decision
to continue smoking or quit, and we model the real-
izations of getting cancer or not. These alternatives
and realizations bring to mind four possible states of
the world, as shown in Table 2. These possible states
have no familiar names; and we simply label them with
numbers. The actual state of the world is not observ-
able, because, if we decide to quit, we won't know for
sure what would have happened had we continued, and
vice-versa. Nonetheless, given the alternatives and re-
alizations in this problem, these states of the world
are well dened.
2
Also, note that, as illustrated by
this example, there can be more possible states of the
world than either realizations or alternatives. In gen-
eral, if we have a decision problem with r realizations
and a alternatives, then we can distinguish as many as
r
a
possible states of the world.
In practice, it is often cumbersome if not impossible
to reason about a monolithic set of alternatives, possi-
ble states of the world, or realizations. Consequently,
we typically describe each of these items in terms of
a set of variables. We call the variables describing a
set of realizations chance variables. For example, in
the omelet story, we can describe the realizations in
terms of three variables: (1) number of eggs in the
2
Howard (1990) discusses in detail what it means for
possible states of the world to be well dened.
omelet?
3
(o), having instances \zero," \ve," and
\six," (2) number of good eggs destroyed? (g), hav-
ing instances \zero," \one," and \ve," and (3) saucer
to wash? (s), having instances \no" and \yes." That
is, every realization corresponds to an assignment of
an instance to each chance variable.
We call the variables describing a set of alternatives de-
cision variables (or decisions, for short). For example,
suppose we have a set of alternatives about how we are
going to dress for work. In this case, we can describe
our alternatives in terms of the decision variables (say)
shirt (\plain" or \striped"), pants (\jeans" or \cor-
duroy"), and shoes (\tennis shoes" or \loafers"). In
this example and in general, every alternative corre-
sponds to an assignment of an instance to each deci-
sion variable.
The description of possible states of the world in terms
of component variables is a bit more complicated, and
is not needed for our explication of unresponsiveness
and limited unresponsiveness. We defer discussion of
this issue to Section 4.1.
As a matter of notation, we use D to denote the set
of decisions that describe the alternatives for a deci-
sion problem, and lower-case letters (e.g., d; e; f) to
denote individual decisions in the set D. Also, we use
U to denote the set of chance variables that describe
the realizations, and lower-case letters (e.g., x; y; z) to
denote individual chance variables in U . In addition,
we use the variable S to denote the state of the world
(the instances of S correspond to the possible states
of the world).
4
Thus, any given decision problem|or
domain, as we sometimes call it|is described by the
variables U , D, and S.
5
With this introduction, we can discuss the concept of
limited unresponsiveness. To illustrate this concept,
consider the following decision problem adapted from
Rubin (1978). Suppose we are a physician who has to
decide whether or not to recommend a treatment to a
3
To emphasize the distinction between chance and de-
cision variables, we put a question mark at the end of the
names of chance variables.
4
We use an uppercase \S" to denote this single variable,
because later we decompose S into a set of variables.
5
Sometimes, for simplicity, we leave S implicit in the
specication of a decision problem.
patient. Given our recommendation, the patient may
or may not actually accept the treatment, and may
or may not be cured as a result. Here, we use a sin-
gle decision variable recommendation (r) to represent
our alternatives (i.e., D = frg), and two chance vari-
ables taken? (t) and cured? (c) to represent whether
or not the patient actually accepts the treatment and
whether or not the patient is cured, respectively (i.e.,
U = ft; cg).
The possible states of the world for this problem are
shown in Table 3. For example, consider the rst row
in the table. Here, the patient will accept the treat-
ment if and only if we recommend it, and will be cured
if and only if he takes the treatment. We describe this
state by saying that the patient is a \complier" and is
\helped" by the treatment. We discuss the description
of these states in more detail in Section 4.1.
As indicated in the table, we have asserted that the
last four states of the world are impossible (i.e., have
a probability of zero). These last four states share the
property that t takes on the same instance for both
alternatives, whereas c does not. Thus, this decision
problem satises the following property: in all of the
states of the world that are possible, if t is the same
for the two alternatives, then c is also the same. We
say that c is unresponsive to r in states limited by t.
In general, suppose we have a decision problem de-
scribed by variables U , D, and S. Let X be a subset of
U , and Y be a subset of U [D. We say that X is unre-
sponsive to D in states limited by Y if we believe that,
for all possible states of the world, if Y assumes the
same instance for any two alternatives then X must
also assume the same instance for those alternatives.
To be more formal, let X[S;D] be the instance that X
assumes (with certainty) given the state of the world
S and the alternative D. For example, in the omelet
story, if S is the state of the world where the egg is
good, and D is the alternative \throw away," then
o[S;D] (the number of eggs in the omelet) assumes the
instance \ve." Then, we have the following denition.
Denition 1 (Limited (Un)responsiveness)
Given a decision problem described by chance variables
U , decision variables D, and state of the world S, and
variable sets X  U and Y  D [ U , X is said to
be unresponsive to D in states limited by Y , denoted
X 6 -
Y
D, if we believe that 8 S 2 S; D
1
2 D; D
2
2
D,
Y [S;D
1
] = Y [S;D
2
] =) X[S;D
1
] = X[S;D
2
]
X is said to be responsive to D in states limited by
Y , denoted X  -
Y
D, if it is not the case that X is
unresponsive to D in states limited by Y . That is, if
we believe that 9 S 2 S; D
1
2 D; D
2
2 D such that
Y [S;D
1
] = Y [S;D
2
] and X[S;D
1
] 6= X[S;D
2
]
When X is (un)responsive to D in states limited by
Y = ;, we simply say that X is (un)responsive to D.
The notion of unresponsiveness is signicantly simpler
than that of limited unresponsiveness. In particular,
when Y = ;, the equalities on the left-hand-side of
the implications in Denition 1 are trivially satised.
Thus, X is unresponsive to D if we believe that, for
all possible states of the world and all alternatives, X
assumes the same instance; and X is responsive to D,
if there is some possible state of the world where X
diers for two dierent alternatives.
As examples of responsive variables, consider the
omelet story. Let S denote the state where the egg is
good, and D
1
and D
2
denote the alternatives \break
into bowl" and \throw away," respectively. Then, for
the variable o (number of eggs in omelet?), we have
o[S;D
1
] =\six" and o[S;D
2
] =\ve". Consequently,
o is responsive to D. In a similar manner, we can con-
clude that g (number of good eggs destroyed?), and s
(saucer to wash?) are each responsive to D as well.
Note that, if an chance variable x is responsive to D,
then|to some degree|it is under the control of the
decision maker. Consequently, the decision maker can
not observe x prior to choosing an alternative for D.
For example, in the omelet story, we can not observe
any of the responsive variables o, g, or s before choos-
ing an alternative.
As an example of an unresponsive variable, suppose we
add S (the state of the world) as a variable to U . (E.g.,
in the omelet story, we can take U to be fS; o; g; sg.)
By Savage's denition of S, it must be unresponsive
to D. Note that adding S to U creates no new states
of the world.
The notions of unresponsiveness and limited unrespon-
siveness are closely related to concepts in counterfac-
tual reasoning (e.g., as described by Lewis (1979)). In
particular, when we determine whether or not a set of
chance variables X is unresponsive to decisions D, we
essentially answer the query \Will the outcome of X
be the same no matter how we choose D?" Further-
more, when we determine whether or not X is unre-
sponsive to D in states limited by Y , we answer the
query \Will the outcome of X be the same no matter
how we choose D, if Y will not change as a result of our
choice?" Queries of this form are of examples counter-
factual queries. One of the fundamental assumptions
of our work presented here is that these queries are eas-
ily answered. In our experience, we have found that
decision makers are indeed comfortable answering such
restricted counterfactual queries.
The concepts of responsiveness and probabilistic inde-
pendence are related, as illustrated by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 If a set of chance variables X is unre-
sponsive to a set of decision variables D, then X is
Table 3: A decision about recommending a medical treatment.
r (recommendation)
S (state of the world) take don't take
t (taken?) c (cured?) t (taken?) c (cured?)
1: complier, helped yes yes no no
2: complier, hurt yes no no yes
3: complier, always cured yes yes no yes
4: complier, never cured yes no no no
5: deer, helped no no yes yes
6: deer, hurt no yes yes no
7: deer, always cured no yes yes yes
8: deer, never cured no no yes no
9: always taker, cured yes yes yes yes
10: always taker, not cured yes no yes no
11: never taker, not cured no no no no
12: never taker, cured no yes no yes
13: (impossible) yes yes yes no
14: (impossible) yes no yes yes
15: (impossible) no no no yes
16: (impossible) no yes no no
probabilistically independent of D.
Proof: By denition of unresponsiveness, X assumes
the same instance for all alternatives in any possible
state of the world. Consequently, we can learn about
X by observing S, but not by observing D. 2
Nonetheless, the two concepts are not identical. In
particular, the converse of Theorem 1 does not hold.
For example, let us consider the simple decision of
whether to bet heads or tails on the outcome of a coin
ip. Assume that the coin is fair (i.e., the probabilities
of heads and tails are both 1/2) and that the person
who ips the coin does not know our bet. Here, the
possible outcomes of the coin toss correspond to the
possible states of the world. Further, let decision vari-
able b denote our bet, and chance variable w describe
the possible realizations that we win or not. In this sit-
uation, w is responsive to b, because for both possible
states of the world, w will be dierent for the dierent
bets. Nonetheless, the probability of w is 1/2, whether
we bet heads or tails. That is, w and b are probabilis-
tically independent.
Limited unresponsiveness and conditional indepen-
dence are less closely related than are their unqual-
ied counterparts. Namely, limited unresponsiveness
does not imply conditional independence. For exam-
ple, in the medical-treatment story, c (cured?) is un-
responsive to r (recommendation) in states limited by
t (taken?), but it is reasonable for us to believe that c
and r are not independent given t, perhaps because
there is some gene that|partially or completely|
determines how a person reacts to both recommen-
dations and treatment.
We can derive several interesting properties of limited
unresponsiveness from its denition.
1. X 6 -
Y
D () 8x 2 X;x 6 -
Y
D
2. X 6 -
W
D ()X [W 6 -
W
D
3. X 6 -
D
D
4. X 6 -
Y
D =) X 6 -
Y[Z
D
5. X 6 -
Y[Z
D and Y 6 -
Z
D =) X 6 -
Z
D
6. X  -
Z
D and W 6 -
Z
D =) X  -
W[Z
D
where D is the set of decision variables in the domain,
X and W are arbitrary sets of chance variables in U ,
and Y and Z are arbitrary sets of variables in U [D.
The proofs of these properties are straightforward. For
example, consider property 5. Given X 6 -
Y[Z
D, we
have 8 S 2 S; D
1
2 D; D
2
2 D,
Y [S;D
1
] = Y [S;D
2
] and Z[S;D
1
] = Z[S;D
2
]
=) X[S;D
1
] = X[S;D
2
]
Given Y 6 -
Z
D, we have 8 S 2 S; D
1
2 D; D
2
2 D,
Z[S;D
1
] = Z[S;D
2
] =) Y [S;D
1
] = Y [S;D
2
]
Consequently, we obtain 8 S 2 S; D
1
2 D; D
2
2 D,
Z[S;D
1
] = Z[S;D
2
] =) X[S;D
1
] = X[S;D
2
]
That is, X 6 -
Z
D.
Other properties follow from these. For example, it is
true trivially that ; 6 -
Y
D. Consequently, by Prop-
erty 2, we know that Y 6 -
Y
D. As another example,
a special case of Property 4 is that whenever X is un-
responsive to D, then X will be unresponsive to D in
states limited by any Z. Also, Properties 4 and 5 imply
that limited unresponsiveness is transitive: X 6 -
Y
D
and Y 6 -
Z
D imply X 6 -
Z
D.
In closing this section, we note that the denition of
limited unresponsiveness can be generalized in several
ways. In one generalization, we can dene what it
means for X  U to be unresponsive to D in states of
the world limited by an instance of Y . Namely, we say
thatX is unresponsive toD in states limited by Y = Y
if, for all possible states of the world S, and for any two
alternatives D
1
and D
2
, Y [S;D
1
] = Y [S;D
2
] = Y
implies X[S;D
1
] = X[S;D
2
]. Furthermore, we can
imagine generalizations where the possible states of
the world are limited by subsets of instances of Y , not
just a single instance of Y .
In a second generalization, we can dene what it means
for a set of chance variables to be unresponsive to a
subset of all of the decisions. In particular, given a
domain described by U and D, we say that X  U
is unresponsive to D
0
 D in worlds limited by Y if
X 6 -
Y[(DnD
0
)
D.
Finally, we can have combinations of these two gen-
eralizations. Nonetheless, except for a brief mention
of each generalization, we do not pursue them in the
remainder of the paper for the sake of simplicity.
3 Denition of Cause
Armed with the primitive notion of limited unrespon-
siveness, we can now formalize our denition of cause.
Denition 2 (Causes with Respect to Decisions)
Given a decision problem described by U and D, and a
variable x 2 U , the variables C  D[U nfxg are said
to be causes for x with respect to D if C is a minimal
set of variables such that x 6 -
C
D.
In our framework, decision variables cannot be caused,
because they are under the control of the decision
maker. Consequently, we dene causes for chance vari-
ables only. The denition says that if we can nd set
of variables Y such that, for all possible states of the
world, x can be dierent for dierent alternatives only
when Y is dierent, then Y must contain a set of causes
for x. Our denition of cause departs from traditional
usage of the term in that we consider causal relation-
ships relative to a set of decisions. Nonetheless, we nd
this departure has an important advantage, which we
discuss shortly.
As an example of our denition, consider the decision
to continue or quit smoking, described by the deci-
sion variable s (smoke) and the chance variable l (lung
cancer?). If we believe that s and l are probabilisti-
cally dependent, then, by Theorem 1, it must be that
l  - s. Furthermore, by Property 3, we know that
l 6 -
s
s. Consequently, by Denition 2, we have that s
is a cause of l with respect to s.
Several consequences of Denition 2 are worth men-
tioning. First, although cause is irreexive by deni-
tion, it is not always asymmetric. For example, in our
story about the coin toss, consider another variable m
that represents whether or not the outcome of the coin
toss matches our bet b. In the story as we have told
it, m is a deterministic function of w (win?), and vice
versa. Consequently, we have w 6 -
m
b and m 6 -
w
b;
and so m is a cause of w and w is cause of m with re-
spect to b. Note that any hint of uncertainty destroys
this symmetry. For example, if there is a possibility
that the person tossing the coin will cheat (so that we
may lose even if we match), then we can conclude that
m is a cause of w, but not vice versa.
Second, cause is transitive for single variables. In par-
ticular, if x is a cause for y and y is a cause for z with
respect to D, then z  -
D
and (by the transitivity of
unresponsiveness) z 6 -
x
D. Consequently, x is a cause
for z with respect to D. Note that transitivity does
not necessarily hold for causes containing sets of vari-
ables, because the minimality condition in Denition 2
may not be satised.
Third, C = ; is a set of causes for x with respect to D
if and only if x is unresponsive to D.
Finally, we have the following theorem, which follows
from Denition 2 and several of the properties of lim-
ited unresponsiveness given in Section 2.
Theorem 2 Given any x 2 U , if C is a set of causes
for x with respect to D, and w 2 C \ U , then w must
be responsive to D.
Proof: For any chance variable w 2 C, let C
0
= C n
fwg. By the minimality condition in our denition,
we have
x -
C
0
D (1)
Suppose that w 6 - D. Then, by Property 4, we have
w 6 -
C
0
D (2)
Applying Equations 1 and 2 to Property 6, we have
that x  -
C
D, which contradicts that C is a set of
causes for x with respect to D. 2
Let us consider another example of our denition that
illustrates an advantage of dening cause with respect
to the set of decisions. In the medical-treatment story,
we have that c (cured?) is responsive to r (recommen-
dation), because (among other reasons) in the rst row
in Table 3, the patient is cured if and only if we rec-
ommend the treatment. Furthermore, as we discussed
in the previous section, c is unresponsive to r in states
limited by t (taken?). Consequently, we have that t is
a cause of c with respect to r.
Now, let us extend this example by imagining that
there is some gene that aects how a person reacts to
both our recommendation and to therapy. In this situ-
ation, it is reasonable for us to assert that the variable
g (genotype?) is unresponsive to r. Thus, by Theo-
rem 2, g cannot be among the causes for any other
variable. Someday, however, it may be possible to
use retroviral therapy to alter one's genetic makeup.
Given an additional decision variable v (retroviral ther-
apy), it is reasonable for us to assert that t is responsive
to D = fr; vg in states limited by r, but unresponsive
to D in states limited by fr; gg. In this case, we can
conclude that fr; gg is a cause for t with respect to D.
In addition, we can conclude that ft; gg is a cause for
c with respect to D.
Thus, an advantage of dening cause with respect to
the set of decisions is that we do not have to attach
a causal explanation to dependencies between a vari-
able x and other variables, when we can do nothing
to change x. In our example, g, t, and c are prob-
abilistically dependent. Nonetheless, if we cannot do
anything to aect genotype, then there is little point
in determining whether or not genotype causes treat-
ment and cure; and it is precisely in this case that
our denition says it is OK to ignore such questions of
cause.
Of course, we sometimes want to be able to assert the
existence or nonexistence of causal dependencies out-
side of a real decision setting. Our denition does not
preclude the ability to make such assertions. Namely,
there is no reason to require that the decisions D be
implementable in practice or at all. If we want to think
about whether or not the patient's genotype is a cause
for his cure, then we can imagine the retroviral-therapy
decision that aects genotype regardless of the avail-
ability of the therapy. As another example, if we want
to discuss the possibility that gender causes breast can-
cer, then we can imagine a decision that changes one's
gender.
Finally, we can generalize our denition of what it
means for a set of variables to cause x to a deni-
tion of what it means for a set of instances to cause
x. Namely, we say that instance C of variables C is
a cause for x =2 C with respect to D if C is a minimal
set of variables such that x is unresponsive to D in
states limited by C = C. That is, the instance C of
C is a cause for x with respect to D if we replace our
denition of cause with the weaker requirement that
x be unresponsive to D in states limited by C = C.
Again, for the sake of simplicity, we do not pursue this
generalization in the remainder of the paper.
4 Graphical Representation of Cause
Given the known benets of the Bayesian network for
representing conditional independence, we would like a
graphical representation of cause and eect. The rep-
resentation we describe is a special case of an inuence
diagram. An inuence diagram for a decision prob-
lem described by U and D is a model for that prob-
lem having a structural component and a probabilistic
component. The structure of an inuence diagram is
a directed acyclic graph containing (square) decision
and (oval) chance nodes corresponding to decision and
chance variables, respectively, as well as information
and relevance arcs. Information arcs, which point to
decision nodes, represent what is known at the time
decisions are made. Relevance arcs, which point to
chance nodes, represent (by their absence) assertions
of conditional independence. Namely, for some order-
ing of the variables, each variable x is probabilistically
independent of all preceding variables given the par-
ents of x. Associated with each chance node x in an
inuence diagram are probability distributions that,
when combined with the assertions of conditional in-
dependence encoded in the structural component, de-
termine the joint probability distribution for U given
D. A special kind of chance node is the determin-
istic node (depicted as a double oval). A node x is
a deterministic node if its corresponding variable is a
deterministic function of its parents. Also, an inu-
ence diagrammay contain a single distinguished node,
called a utility node that encodes the decision maker's
utility for each state of the node's parents. A utility
node is a deterministic function of its predecessors and
can have no children. Finally, for an inuence diagram
to be well formed, its decisions must be totally ordered
by the inuence-diagram structure. (For more details,
see Howard [1981].)
In this paper, we concern ourselves neither with the or-
dering of decision nodes nor the observation of chance
variables before making decisions. Therefore, we have
no need for information arcs. In addition, although
our new concepts apply to models that include a util-
ity node, we do not examine such models, as we can
illustrate these concepts with models containing only
chance, deterministic, and decision variables. An in-
uence diagram (without information arcs or a utility
node) for the medical-treatment problem is shown in
Figure 1a.
In Heckerman and Shachter (1994), we showed that an
ordinary inuence diagram is an inadequate represen-
tation of causal dependence. In this section, we dis-
cuss a particular kind of an inuence diagram, known
as an inuence diagram in canonical form, that can
accurately represent causal relationships.
4.1 Mapping Variables and Causal
Mechanisms
Before we can describe canonical form, we need to in-
troduce the concept of a mapping variable. To under-
stand the concept of a mapping variable, let us reexam-
Table 4: The mapping variable t(r).
instance of t(r) r =take r =don't take
1: complier t =yes t =no
2: deer t =no t =yes
3: always taker t =yes t =yes
4: never taker t =no t =no
ine Savage's basic formulation of a decision problem.
Recall that the chance variables U are a deterministic
function of the decision variables D and the state of
the world S. In eect, each possible state of the world
denes a mapping from the decisions D to the chance
variables U . Thus, S represents all possible mappings
from D to U . We can characterize S as a mapping
variable for U as a function of D, and use the sugges-
tive notation U (D) to denote this mapping variable.
In general, given a domain described by U , D, and S,
a set of decision variables Y  D, and a set of chance
variablesX  U , the mapping variableX(Y ) is a vari-
able that represents the possible mappings from Y to
X. Rubin (1978) and Howard (1990) dene concepts
similar to the mapping variable.
As an example, consider the medical-treatment story.
The mapping variable t(r) represents the possible
mappings from the decision variable r (recommenda-
tion) to the chance variable t (taken?). In this exam-
ple, the instances of t(r), shown in Table 4, have a nat-
ural interpretation. In particular, the instance where
the patient accepts treatment if and only if we recom-
mend it represents a patient who \complies" with our
recommendation; the instance where the patient ac-
cepts treatment if and only if we recommend against
it represents a patient who \dees" our recommenda-
tion; and so on.
An important property concerning mapping variables
is that, given variables X;Y; and X(Y ), we can always
write X as a deterministic function of Y and X(Y ).
For example, t is a deterministic function of r and t(r);
and, more generally, U is a deterministic function of
D and U (D)  S.
In the discussions that follow, it is important to extend
the denition of a mapping variable to include chance
variables as arguments. Doing so allows us to decom-
pose the monolithic mapping variable U (D)  S for a
domain into a set of variables. For example, consider
the medical-treatment story. Given this extension
of the mapping-variable denition, we can dene the
mapping variable c(t) with instances \helped," \hurt,"
\always cured," and \never cured." Together, the
mapping variables t(r) and c(t) describe the possible
states of the world U (D)  S. (E.g., t(r) =\complier"
and c(t) =\helped" corresponds to state 1 in Ta-
ble 3.) As we shall see, this decomposition facilitates
the graphical representation of causal relationships.
The extension of the mapping-variable denition to
include chance variables as arguments is a bit tricky.
For example, when the patient is an \always taker",
it is impossible to distinguish between the instances
\helped" and \always cured" of c(t), because for both
recommendations, the patient will accept the treat-
ment. In this sense, the variable c(t) is not well de-
ned.
We can overcome this problem by imagining a decision
that allows us to directly set t to any of its instances,
regardless of the recommendation decision. The key
idea in setting this variable directly is that we force t
to take on a particular instance without changing the
instances of any other variables except those that are
mandated by the known causal relationships in the do-
main. For example, assuming the treatment is a drug
and that there is no placebo eect, we can directly set t
to \taken" by injecting the patient with the drug with-
out his knowledge. In contrast, although we can set
t to \taken" by physically forcing the patient to take
the drug, this operation may not qualify as a setting
of the variable if the patient's conditioned is worsened
by the use of force itself.
Pearl and Verma (1991) and Spirtes et al. (1993) dis-
cuss the notion of directly setting or manipulating a
variable, taking this concept to be primitive. Here,
we formally dene the notion in terms of limited un-
responsiveness.
Denition 3 (Set Decision) Given a domain de-
scribed by U , D, and S, consider a set of decision
variables outside D, denoted
^
U , that contains one de-
cision variable x^ for every x 2 U , where x^ has alter-
natives \set x to k" for each possible instance k of x
and \do nothing." Let U
0
= U , D
0
= D[
^
U , and S
0
be
an augmentation of the original domain in the sense
that, (1) when each x^ 2
^
U is set to \do nothing", the
realizations in the augmented domain (as a function
of S
0
and D
0
) are the same as those in the original
domain, and (2) when x^ =\set x to k," then x as-
sumes the state k. Then,
^
U is said to be a collection
of set decision variables for U with respect to U , D,
and S if, for all Y  U and Z  U [D, x 6 -
Z
D in
the original domain if and only if x 6 -
Z[Y
D [
^
Y
6
in
the augmented domain, where
^
Y are the set decisions
corresponding to the variables in Y .
For example, in the medical-treatment story, we have
that c 6 -
t
r. Thus, in the augmented domain, we
must have c 6 -
t
fr;
^
tg for
^
t to be a set decision for
t. It is likely that a decision to secretly inject the
patient satises this condition (again, provided there is
no placebo eect), whereas it is unlikely that a decision
6
In writing this expression, we are using the second gen-
eralization of the denition of limited unresponsiveness dis-
cussed in Section 2. In particular, this expression is equiv-
alent to the statement x 6 -
Z[Y[(
^
Un
^
Y )
D
0
.
to use physical force does. Note that, in general, set
decisions need only be hypothesized. They need not
be implementable in practice.
Denition 4 (Setting a Variable) Given a deci-
sion variable d, we set that variable by choosing one
of its alternatives. Given a chance variable x, we set
that variable by choosing one of the alternatives of x^
other than \do nothing."
We can now give the general dention of a mapping
variable.
Denition 5 (Mapping Variable)
Given chance variables X and variables Y , the map-
ping variable X(Y ) is the chance variable that repre-
sents all possible mappings from Y to X as we set Y
to each of its possible instances.
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There are several important points to be made about
mapping variables as we have now dened them. First,
as in the more specic case, X is always a deterministic
function of Y and X(Y ).
Second, additional probability assessments typically
are required when introducing a mapping variable into
a probabilistic model. For example, two independent
assessments are needed to quantify the relationship be-
tween r and t in the medical-treatment story; whereas
three independent assessments are required for the
node t(r). In general, many additional assessments
are required. If X has b instances and Y has a in-
stances, then X(Y ) has as many as b
a
instances. In
real-world domains, however, reasonable assertions of
independence decrease the number of required assess-
ments. In some cases, no additional assessments are
necessary (see, e.g., Heckerman et al. 1994).
Third, although we may not be able to observe a map-
ping variable directly, we may be able to learn some-
thing about it. For example, we can model the decision
to continue or quit smoking using the decision vari-
able s (smoke), the chance variable l (lung cancer?),
and the mapping variable l(s). Although we cannot
observe l(s), we can imagine a test that measures the
susceptibility of someone's lung tissue to lung cancer
in the presence of tobacco smoke. Given the result of
such a test, we can update our probability distribution
over l(s).
Fourth, we have the following theorem and corollaries.
Theorem 3 (Mapping Variable) Given a decision
problem described by U and D, variables X  U , and
7
There are some technical details involved with the def-
inition of a mapping variable when particular instances
of Y are not possible or not possible for particular in-
stances of D. Although all of the results given here are
true in general, we omit these special cases for simplicity
in presentation.
variable setsW , Y , and Z that are all subsets of U[D,
X(W ) 6 -
Z[Y
D if and only if X(W [ Y ) 6 -
Z
D.
Proof: X(W [ Y ) represents all possible mappings
from W [ Y to X. By the denition of a mapping
variable,X(W [Y ) 6 -
Z
D if and only ifX(W ) 6 -
Z[Y
D[
^
Y
U
, where Y
U
= Y \U is the set of chance variables
in Y . Likewise, by the denition of a set decision,
X(W ) 6 -
Z[Y
D[
^
Y
U
if and only if X(W ) 6 -
Z[Y
D.2
Corollary 4 (Mapping Variable) Given a deci-
sion problem described by U and D, variables X  U ,
and Y  U [D, X 6 -
Y
D if and only if X(Y ) 6 - D.
For example, in the medical treatment story, we have
c 6 -
t
r and c(t) 6 - r. Roughly speaking, Corollary 4
says that X is unresponsive to D in states limited by
Y if and only if the way X depends on Y does not
depend on D. This equivalence provides us with an
alternative set of conditions for cause.
Corollary 5 (Cause) Given a decision problem de-
scribed by U and D, and a chance variable x 2 U , the
variables C  D [ U n fxg are causes for x with re-
spect to D if C is a minimal set of variables such that
x(C) 6 - D.
We can think of x(C)|where C are causes for x|as a
causal mechanism that relates C and x. For example,
suppose chance variables i and o represent the volt-
age input and output, respectively, of an inverter in a
logic circuit. Given a decision d to which i responds,
we can assert that fig is a cause for o. In this exam-
ple, the mapping variable o(i), represents the mapping
from the inverter's inputs to its outputs. That is, this
mapping variable represents the state of the inverter
itself.
Denition 6 (Causal Mechanism) Given a deci-
sion problem described by U and D and a chance vari-
able x 2 U that is responsive to D, a causal mech-
anism for x with respect to D is a mapping variable
x(C) where C are causes for x with respect to D.
Thus, we have the following consequence of Corol-
lary 4.
Corollary 6 (Causal Mechanism) If x(C) is a
causal mechanism for x with respect to D, then x(C)
is unresponsive to D.
4.2 Canonical Form Inuence Diagrams
We can now dene what it means for an inuence di-
agram to be in canonical form.
Denition 7 (Canonical Form) An inuence dia-
gram for a decision problem described by U and D is
said to be in canonical form if (1) all chance nodes that
rt
c
(a) (b)
r
t
c
t(r)
c(t)
Figure 1: (a) An inuence diagram for the medical-
treatment story. (b) A corresponding inuence dia-
gram in canonical form.
are responsive to D are descendants of one or more de-
cision nodes and (2) all chance nodes that are descen-
dants of one or more decision nodes are deterministic
nodes.
An immediate consequence of this denition is that
any chance node that is not a descendant of decision
node must be unresponsive to D.
We can construct an inuence diagram in canonical
form for a given problem by including in the inuence
diagram a causal mechanism for every variable that is
responsive to the decisions. In doing so, we can make
every responsive variable a deterministic function of
a set of its causes and the unresponsive causal mech-
anism. For example, consider the medical-treatment
story as depicted in the inuence diagram of Figure 1a.
The variables t and c are responsive to r, but their cor-
responding nodes are not deterministic. Consequently,
this inuence diagram is not in canonical form. To
construct a canonical form inuence diagram, we in-
troduce the mapping variables t(r) and c(t), as shown
in Figure 1b. The responsive variables are now deter-
ministic; and the mapping variables are unresponsive
to the decision. This example illustrates an important
point: Causal mechanismsmay be probabilistically de-
pendent. We return to this issue in Section 4.3.
In general, we can construct an inuence diagram in
canonical form for the decision problem U and D as
follows.
Algorithm 1 (Canonical Form)
1. Add a node to the diagram corresponding to each
variable in U [D
2. Order the variables x
1
; : : : ; x
n
in U so that the
variables unresponsive to D come rst
3. For each variable x
i
2 U that is unresponsive to
D,
(a) Add a causal-mechanism chance node x
i
(C
i
)
to the diagram,
where C
i
 D [ fx
1
; : : : ; x
i 1
g
(b) Make x
i
a deterministic node with parents C
i
and x
i
(C
i
)
4. Assess dependencies among the variables that are
unresponsive to D
This algorithm is well dened. In particular, it is al-
ways possible to nd a C
i
satisfying the condition in
step 3a, because x
i
6 -
D
D by Property 3.
Also, the structure of the of the constructed inuence
diagram is valid. Namely, by Corollary 6, all causal
mechanisms added in step 3 are unresponsive to D.
Thus, suppose we identify the relevance arcs and de-
terministic nodes by using a variable ordering where
the nodes in D are followed by the unresponsive nodes
(including the causal mechanisms), which are in turn
followed by the responsive nodes in the order specied
at step 2. Then, (1) we would add no arcs from D to
the unresponsive nodes by Theorem 1 (and the algo-
rithm adds none); (2) we would add arcs among the
unresponsive nodes as described in step 4; and (3) for
every responsive variable x
i
, we would make x
i
a de-
terministic node (as described in step 3b) by denition
of a mapping variable.
Furthermore, the structure that results from Algo-
rithm 1 will be in canonical form. In particular, be-
cause there are no arcs from D to the unresponsive
nodes, only responsive variables can be descendants of
D. In addition, by Theorem 2, we know that every
responsive node is a descendant of D, and (by con-
struction) a deterministic node.
To illustrate the algorithm, consider the medical-
treatment story as depicted by the inuence diagram
in Figure 2a where the variable g (genotype?) is rep-
resented explicitly. To construct an inuence diagram
in canonical form for this problem, we rst add the
variables fr; g; t; cg to the diagram and choose the or-
dering (g; t; c). Both t and c are responsive toD = frg,
and have causes r and t, respectively. Consequently,
we add causal mechanisms t(r) and c(t) to the new
diagram, and make t a deterministic function of r and
t(r) and c a deterministic function of t and c(t). Fi-
nally, we assess the dependencies among the unrespon-
sive variables fg; t(r); c(t)g, adding arcs from g to t(r)
and c(t) under the assumption that the causal mech-
anisms are conditionally independent given g. The
resulting canonical form inuence diagram is shown in
Figure 2b.
From our construction, it follows that every responsive
variable x
i
has at least one set of causes explicitly en-
coded in the diagram (C
i
). That is, a canonical form
rt
c
g
(a) (b)
r
t
c
t(r)
c(t)
g
Figure 2: (a) Another inuence diagram for the
medical-treatment story. (b) A corresponding inu-
ence diagram in canonical form.
inuence diagram constructed as in Algorithm 1 ac-
curately represents a set of causes for every variable
having a nonempty set of causes. In this sense, we
nd canonical form to be an adequate representation
of cause.
Canonical form is a generalization of Howard Canon-
ical Form, which was developed by Howard (1990) to
facilitate the computation of value of information.
4.3 Pearl's Causal Theory
There is a close relationship between the canoni-
cal form inuence diagram and Pearl's causal theory
(Pearl and Verma, 1991; Pearl, 1995). In fact, as we
now demonstrate, a causal theory is a special case of
canonical form.
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Pearl takes causation to be a primitive notion, and de-
nes a causal model for variables U to be a directed
acyclic graph where each node corresponds to a vari-
able in U and each nonroot node is caused by its par-
ents. Each variable in his analysis plays a dual role
of chance and decision variable. In particular, a vari-
able may be observed or directly set to a particular
instance. As mentioned, Pearl takes the concept of
directly setting a variable to be a primitive.
Given a causal model for U , Pearl goes on to dene
a causal theory for U . Here, we express his denition
in the language of inuence diagrams. Let M(U ) be
a causal model for U . Let Pa(x) denote the parents
of x inM(U ), which by denition are causes for x. A
causal theory for U based on M(U ), which we denote
T (U ), is an inuence diagram described as follows.
For each variable x
i
2 U , i = 1; : : : ; n, T (U ) contains
a corresponding chance variable x
i
, a set decision x^
i
for
8
We note that Pearl's causal theory and the pseudo-
indeterministic system of Spirtes et al. (1993) are very
similar, and many of the remarks in this section apply to
the latter representation as well.
x
i
, and a chance variable 
i
, which Pearl calls a distur-
bance variable. Furthermore, in the inuence diagram
T (U ), only the chance nodes x
i
have parents. In par-
ticular, each x
i
is a deterministic function of Pa(x
i
),
x^
i
, and 
i
, where (1) if x^
i
= k then x
i
= k, and (2)
if x^
i
=\do nothing" then x = f
i
[Pa(x
i
); 
i
] for some
deterministic function f
i
. Note that, in a causal the-
ory, disturbance variables are mutually independent
by denition.
Now, in our framework, suppose we have a set of
chance variables U and a corresponding collection of
set decisions
^
U for U with respect to U . In addi-
tion, suppose that, for all x
i
, Pa(x
i
) [ fx^
i
g is a set
of causes for x
i
with respect to
^
U . When we con-
struct an inuence diagram in canonical form as de-
scribed in Algorithm 1 using an ordering consistent
with the causal modelM(U ), we can obtain an inu-
ence diagram where each variable x
i
is a determinis-
tic function of x^
i
, Pa(x
i
), and the causal mechanism
x
i
(Pa(x
i
); x^
i
). Given the denition of a set decision,
we can simplify each such relationship by writing x
i
as
a deterministic function of x^
i
, Pa(x
i
), and the variable
x
i
(Pa(x
i
)), where x
i
(Pa(x
i
)) represents the possible
mappings fromPa(x
i
) to x
i
when x^
i
is set to \do noth-
ing." If we identify each mapping variable x
i
(Pa(x
i
))
with Pearl's disturbance variable 
i
, then we obtain an
inuence diagram identical to the causal theory T (U ),
with the exception that the mapping variables in this
inuence diagram may be dependent.
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The fact that disturbance variables must be indepen-
dent in a causal theory does not necessarily limit the
expressiveness of a causal theory. Such dependencies
often disappear when hidden common causes are in-
troduced. Furthermore, the assumption that causal
mechanisms are independent has the convenient con-
sequence that the a causal model for U can be inter-
preted as a Bayesian network in the traditional sense
(Spirtes et al., 1993; Pearl, 1995). That is, if variables
X and Y are d-separated by Z in the causal model,
then X and Y are conditionally independent given Z
according to the causal theory.
Nonetheless, the fact that we can use canonical form to
represent causes locally|that is, we represent causes
only when they are relevant to the decisions at hand|
makes canonical form a more ecient representation
than the causal theory. For example, to represent
the relationships in Figure 2b using a causal theory,
we would introduce causal-mechanism variables t(r; g)
and c(t; g). Assuming r; g; t and c are binary variables,
9
At rst glance, there appears to be another dierence
between the two representations. Namely, the disturbance
variables in T (U) are assumed to be merely independent
of the set decisions
^
U ; whereas, in the canonical form inu-
ence diagram, the mapping variables are also unresponsive
to the set decisions. A careful reading of Pearl's work, how-
ever, suggests that the disturbance variables must in fact
be unresponsive to the set decisions.
both mapping variables in the causal theory would
have 16 instances. In contrast, both mapping variables
in Figure 2b have only four instances. Consequently,
the nodes g, t(r; g) and c(t; g) in the causal-theory rep-
resentation require 31 probabilities in total, whereas
the nodes g, c(s), and v(d) in the canonical-form rep-
resentation require only 13 probabilities in total.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a precise denition of cause and
eect in terms of the more fundamental notion of un-
responsiveness. Our denition departs from the tradi-
tional view of causation in that our causal assertions
are made relative to a set of decisions. As a conse-
quence, our denition allows for models where only
some dependencies have a causal explanation. We have
shown how these properties can make the represen-
tation and manipulation of causal relationships more
ecient.
In addition, we have examined the graphical encod-
ing of causation. We have shown how the ordinary
inuence diagram is inadequate as a graphical repre-
sentation of cause, but that the canonical form inu-
ence diagram is always an accurate language for causal
dependence. Also, we have described the relationship
between Pearl's causal theory and canonical form in-
uence diagrams.
An important aspect of causality that we have barely
touched upon in this paper is the notion of time. For
example, what if our alternatives consists of reactive
plans, where observations are interspersed with ac-
tions? More generally, what happens when system
variables change in time? We will explore these issues
and others in a sequel to this paper.
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